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RESUMO 
As políticas públicas de apoio ao empreendedorismo e à inovação desempenham um papel relevante 
quando as empresas têm dificuldades de acesso ao financiamento externo. No entanto, alguns 
autores encontraram evidências de ineficiência no longo prazo em empresas subvencionadas 
(Bernini and Pelligrini, 2011; Cerqua and Pelligrini, 2014) e de ineficácia dos fundos públicos (Jorge 
and Suárez, 2011). 
O objetivo do presente artigo é de avaliar a eficácia no processo de seleção de candidaturas a um 
financiamento público destinado a estimular a inovação. Usando um modelo de escolha binário, 
pretendemos determinar quais os fatores que influenciam a probabilidade de obter um apoio 
público destinado a financiar um investimento inovador. As variáveis explicativas estão relacionadas 
com o perfil da entidade promotora, as características do projeto e o ambiente macroeconômico. A 
análise baseia-se no estudo de caso do Sistema de Incentivo à Inovação (SI Inovação) português, 
nomeadamente nas candidaturas geridas pelo Programa Operacional Regional do Alentejo, no 
período 2007-2013. 
Os resultados mostram que o processo de seleção é mais focado no impacto esperado do projeto do 
que no desempenho histórico das empresas candidatas. Fatores que influenciam a decisão de 
conceder um empréstimo bancário, não parecem influenciar a decisão do avaliador em financiar 
certos projetos. Um registo histórico de despesas em ID&T não é significativo para determinar a 
probabilidade de ter uma candidatura aprovada no âmbito do Si Inovação, enquanto aumentar o 
número de patentes e de postos de trabalho qualificados são fatores relevantes. No entanto, alguns 
indícios de ineficiência no curto prazo foram encontrados, uma vez obter uma vez ter um apoio 
financeiro público está relacionado com um menor aumento da produtividade no ano pós-projeto. A 
nível macroeconómico, períodos marcados por um custo do capital mais elevado nos mercados 
financeiros estão relacionados com uma maior probabilidade de ter uma candidatura aprovada, 
fenómeno que pode estar associado à eficácia dos apoios públicos em corrigir falhas de mercado. 
Palavras-chave: Eficácia, Inovação, Fundos públicos 
THE SELECTION PROCESS OF APPLICATIONS TO THE PORTUGUESE INNOVATION INCENTIVE 
SYSTEM: WHO GETS FINANCIAL SUPPORT? 
ABSTRACT 
Public policies to support entrepreneurship and innovation play a vital role when firms have 
difficulties in accessing external finance. However, some authors have found evidence of long-term 
inefficiency in subsidized firms (Bernini and Pelligrini, 2011; Cerqua and Pelligrini, 2014) and 
ineffectiveness of public funds (Jorge and Suárez, 2011). 
The aim of the paper is to assess the effectiveness in the selection process of applications to public 
financial support for stimulating innovation. Using a binary choice model, we investigate which 
factors influence the probability of obtaining public support for an innovative investment. The 
explanatory variables are connected to firm profile, the characteristics of the project and the 
macroeconomic environment. The analysis is based on the case study of the Portuguese Innovation 
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Incentive System (PIIS) and on the applications managed by the Alentejo Regional Operational 
Program in the period 2007 – 2013.     
The results show that the selection process is more focused on the expected impact of the project 
than on the firm’s past performance. Factors that influence the credit risk and the decision to grant a 
bank loan do not seem to influence the government evaluator regarding the funding of some 
projects. Past activities in R&D do not significantly affect the probability of having an application 
approved under the PIIS, whereas an increase in the number of patents and the number of skilled 
jobs are both relevant factors. Nevertheless, some evidence of firms’ short-term inefficiency was 
found, in that receiving public financial support is linked to a smaller increase in productivity 
compared to non-approved firm applications. At the macroeconomic level, periods with a higher cost 
of capital in financial markets are linked to a greater probability of getting an application for public 
support approved, which could be associated with the effectiveness of public support in correcting 
market failings. 
Keywords: Effectiveness, Innovation, Public funding. 
JEL Code:L53, O31, O38 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Innovation is at the heart of the Europe 2020 Strategy and special attention is given to increasing the 
effectiveness and efficiency of innovation policy instruments. Public policies to support 
entrepreneurship and innovation play a vital role when firms have difficulties in accessing finance. 
Erden & Holcombe (2005) demonstrated that public investment can have a leverage effect on private 
investment, especially when access to bank credit is limited. Paunov (2012) also highlighted that, in 
times of crisis, companies with access to public funding are less likely to reduce or abandon their 
innovation activities. Indeed, small and innovative firms have more constraints and difficulties in 
accessing finance, since they tend to have riskier projects and business models (Lee et al., 2015). In 
the presence of market failings, public support for Research & Development & Innovation (RDI) aims 
to fill the gap, in order to improve knowledge production and come as close as possible to the 
socially optimal level. 
Nevertheless, some authors have found evidence of long-term inefficiency in subsidized firms 
(Bernini and Pelligrini, 2011; Cerqua and Pelligrini, 2014) and ineffectiveness of public funds (Jorge 
and Suárez, 2011). According to Bernini and Pellegrini (2011) and Cerqua and Pelligrini (2014), 
subsidized firms tend to show lower productivity growth than non-subsidized firms, because firms 
are induced to reach the optimal level of employment in order to obtain the subsidy. Jorge and 
Suárez (2011) defend that if firms benefiting from R&D subsidies are less efficient, this could mean 
that the allocation of public resources is not optimal, making it difficult to achieve policy targets and 
objectives. So it seems that the inefficiency of subsidized firms could be linked to the selection 
process for awarding public support. 
The aim of the present paper is precisely to assess which factors influence the public decision to 
financially support an innovative investment project. The analysis is focused on the case study of the 
Portuguese Innovation Incentive System (PIIS) in the Alentejo region, between 2007 and 2013. The 
methodology is based on a binary choice model. Explanatory variables are connected to: i) Firms’ 
characteristics (size, activity sector, financial performance and risk level); ii) Project or applications’ 
characteristics (amount of investment and expected impact); iii. Macroeconomic factors (Euribor and 
regional GDP variation). 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the background and a literature review 
on the determinants of receiving public support. Section 3 provides a brief presentation of the 
Portuguese Innovation Incentive System. Section 4 describes the Portuguese Alentejo region in terms 
of innovation and entrepreneurial trends. Section 5 discusses data collection and the methodological 
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approach implemented. Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 presents the main conclusions and 
some policy recommendations. 
 
2. DETERMINANTS OF RECEIVING PUBLIC R&D SUPPORT 
Several studies (Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002; Aerts and Thorwarth, 2008; González and Pazó, 2008; 
Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 2011; Hud and Hussinger, 2015), assessing the added value or potential 
crowding-out effect of public R&D support, started their analysis with an assessment of the 
probability of receiving a subsidy, in order to control for potential endogeneity issues. Indeed, when 
we assess the impact of public subsidies, we need to take into account that public funding is an 
endogenous variable, because for a firm to receive public support it needs to apply for funding, 
which the government may or may not grant (Busom, 2000:114). However, few authors provide a 
precise analysis of the selection process of applicants for public support. Most studies are more 
focused on comparing subsidized and non-subsidized firms and on determining the probability of 
obtaining public support. In the present paper, we are more focused on understanding when a firm 
applies for a subsidy which factors influence the decision to grant this. 
The literature identifies several determinants affecting the probability of receiving an R&D subsidy 
(see Appendix A.1.): the age and size of the firm, previous experience of receiving  subsidies, the 
qualification of human capital, patent stock, past R&D activities, export intensity and the firm’s 
relationship with a national or foreign group.   
To be effective, the process of selecting applicants for financial public support needs to take into 
account the maximization of potential outcomes in the funded firms. Bearing in mind this 
assumption, we expect a certain government preference for companies with a specific profile. 
Firm size, measured by the number of employees, could have a positive or negative impact on the 
likelihood of receiving some public support. Large firms have a greater innovation capacity, which 
means a higher potential to reach positive economic outcomes (Hud and Hussinger, 2015), but 
typically, policy instruments are more focused on providing support to small and medium-sized firms 
(Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 2011). Indeed, small firms have more difficulties in gaining access to 
external finance (Lee et al., 2015). 
Young firms also have more limited access to the capital market and insufficient financial resources 
to invest in innovative projects (Aschhoff, 2009). In order to fill the market gap, innovation policy 
usually gives special attention to start-up companies (Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 2011). 
Previous experience in innovation projects, measured by past R&D activities or in other funding 
programs, could have a positive impact on the probability of receiving (new) public support, because 
public authorities tend to follow the “pick the winner” principle, with the aim of minimizing the risk 
of failure (Czarnitzki and Fier 2002; Aerts and Thorwarth, 2008; Aschhoff, 2009; Czarnitzki and Lopes 
Bento, 2011). Firms’ patent stock is also another indicator of successful R&D activities with an 
expected positive impact on the probability of getting a subsidy (Aerts and Thorwarth, 2008). 
Another indicator of the quality of the firm’s innovative capacity is the presence of highly qualified 
personnel. Indeed, the ability to develop and implement an R&D project is strongly related to the 
skills of the firm’s human capital (Blanes and Busom, 2004). 
Firms that are part of an enterprise group are more likely to benefit from potential spillover effects 
as a result of network linkages (Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 2011), which could also influence 
government evaluators to select this kind of firm (Hud and Hussinger, 2015). 
Firms more active in foreign markets, measured by export intensity, may also be more innovative 
than others (Aerts and Thorwarth, 2008; Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 2011; Hud and Hussinger, 2015) 
and are consequently more likely to achieve higher performance and more successful projects.  
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In the model developed, we include all the mentioned variables52 and also others used by banks 
when assessing credit risk, namely the return on equity and the solvency ratio of applicant firms (see 
e.g. Louizis et al., 2012; Chaibi and Ftiti, 2015), in order to control for the effectiveness of PIIS in 
counteracting debt and equity financing constraints. Indeed, firms with historically lower levels of 
these indicators are less attractive for new investors or banks, because they show lower performance 
and more financial vulnerability. 
Macroeconomic factors in the year of submitting the application, measured by the regional GDP 
variation and the value of Euribor (Euro Interbank Offered Rate) are also taken into account with the 
aim of controlling for external factors which affect SMEs’ access to finance and growth. 
 
3. PORTUGUESE INNOVATION INCENTIVE SYSTEM53 
The analysis is based on the case study of the Portuguese Innovation Incentive System (PIIS) and on 
the applications managed by the Alentejo Regional Operational Program in the period 2007 – 2013. 
The PIIS is an instrument of the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRD) 2007 – 2013, 
included in the Operational Program for Competitiveness Factors (COMPETE) and funded by the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The budget allocated to PIIS is close to 2 billion euros, 
which represents about 10% of the total NSRD budget and 50% of the total COMPETE budget. Other 
instruments of COMPETE are namely the Incentive System for Qualification and Internationalization 
of SMEs and the Incentive System for Technology Research and Development in companies. 
The beneficiaries of PIIS are companies from industry, commerce, services, tourism, energy, 
transport and logistics sectors. The incentive system provides financial support to innovative firms 
through subsidized loans. However, part of the loan could become non-refundable if the beneficiary 
achieves the established objectives. 
The PIIS was designed with the aim of stimulating investment in innovation and the goals of :i) 
promoting innovation in businesses through the production of new goods, services and processes 
that foster their progression in the value chain; ii) making technological improvements and boosting 
their orientation towards international markets; iii) stimulating qualified entrepreneurship and 
structural investment in new areas with growth potential. 
Assessment for effective project selection regarding the PIIS goals will be made introducing 
indicators linked to the project’s expected impact, such as, the amount of investment, export 
intensity ratio, variation of skilled jobs and increased productivity. 
 
4. ALENTEJO REGION: INNOVATIVE AND ENTREPRENEURIAL CAPACITIES  
When the NSRD 2007 – 2013 was designed, the Portuguese Alentejo region NUTS level II was 
considered as a European region belonging to the Convergence Regions group54,due to its major 
structural problems (CCDRA, 2015:2). 
The Alentejo accounts for nearly one third of the Portuguese mainland, but its population only 
represents 7.16 % of the Portuguese total. The region has even a negative development trend - 757 
thousand inhabitants in 2011, against 777 thousand inhabitants in 2001 (Census, 2001 and INE, 
2015). The Alentejo has a population density which is about a fifth of the national average and an 
older than average population (INE, 2015).  
Concerning education indicators for pre-primary and secondary education and the proportion of 
females in secondary education, the Alentejo has a more favorable position than the rest of the 
                                                          
52 Firm as part of an enterprise group is not included in the model because this information is not available in our dataset. 
53Section based on information on COMPETE Website: http://www.pofc.qren.pt/areas/incentives-to-companies/innovation (accessed on 
15th February 2016). 
54This kind of region is characterized by greater structural problems and a GDP per capita below 75% of the European average and they are 
consequently the main recipients of EU funds (CCDRA, 2015:2). 
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country (INE, 2015). However, when we look at indicators for higher education, the Alentejo's 
position is less favorable regarding the enrolment rate (19%), the proportion of students enrolled in 
S&T areas of tertiary education (18.9%) and graduates from tertiary education per 1.000 inhabitants 
(41.6%), compared to Portugal as a whole (INE, 2015).  
Distribution of the employed population according to main occupation shows that the Alentejo has a 
smaller proportion of the population in activities requiring lower qualifications (INE, 2015).  
Between 2007 and 2013, the Alentejo region, like the whole country, was hit by the economic crisis. 
GDP per capita decreased both in value and in relation to the national average, and in fact its 
contribution to the national GDP was less in 2013 than in 2007. Export intensity and the region’s 
degree of openness also show results below the national average. However, between 2007 and 2013 
the region recorded an increase in its labor productivity and its density of enterprises (Table 1).  
Indicators Portugal Alentejo 2007 2013 2007 2013 
GDP as % of total Portugal 100 100,0 6,9 6,4 
GDP per capita (thousand euros) 15,400 16,282 14,700 14,605 
GDP per capita (disparity index | Portugal=100) 100 100,0 95,6 89,7 
Apparent labour productivity (GVA/Employment) 27,300 33,655 30,000 34,780 
Density of enterprises (No./km2) 12 11,9 2,2 2,4 
Export intensity n.a 27,73 n.a 25,91 
Degree of openness n.a 62 n.a 46 
GERD as percentage of GDP (%) 1,21   1,33   0,14   0,46 
R&D personnel (FTE) in active population (‰)   0,6   8,8   0,3   2,9 
Average expenditure on R&D per unit (thousand euros) 693,9   636,4   104,2   381,4 
Table 1. Indicators of enterprises, Portugal and Alentejo (2007 and 2013) 
Source: INE (2009, 2015). Legend: GDP - Gross domestic product, GVA - Gross value added; GERD – Expenditure on R&D; 
R&D - Research and Development; n.a - information not available. 
 
Regarding the innovation capacities of the region, despite a significant increase in expenditure on 
R&D and R&D personnel between 2007 and 2013, the Alentejo is still far from the national average 
(Table 1). 
As we can see from the brief description of the economic and social panorama of the Alentejo, the 
present study focuses on a region which, despite some improvement in absolute terms and the 
financial support of EU funds, is still short of the national average. Therefore, we can possibly 
question the effectiveness of public financial support and specifically, the selection process to award 
this.  
 
5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
The dataset was built with cross-information provided by the entity in charge of the PIIS in the 
Alentejo region, Commission for Coordination and Regional Development of the Alentejo (CCDRA) 
and statistical data from official entities (e.g. Portuguese National Institute of Statistics and PORDATA 
database). 
The sample has 451 observations, which correspond to the number of applications submitted to PIIS 
by firms located in the Alentejo region. The approval rate is 48%55. The total amount of investment 
approved was 660 million euros associated with 306 million euros of subsidized loans. More than 
66% of applications were submitted by micro-sized enterprises. Young enterprises represent almost 
62% of the sample. Applications for industry and tourism activities account for nearly 70% of the 
observations (Figure 1). 
                                                          
55 This result is even higher than Busom’s (2000) finding. The author found an approval rate of 39% for Spanish firms applying for R&D 
public support. 
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Figure 1. Main description of the sample 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from CCDRA (21.10.2014). 
Note: The classification of SMEs is based on Commission recommendation of 6 May 2003, concerning the definition of 
micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. 
 
Using a binary choice model – cloglog56 (1) – the study aims to determine which factors influenced 
the probability of obtaining public support for an innovative investment.  
         (1) 
The explanatory variables are connected to: i) Firms’ characteristics (e.g. size, activity sector, financial 
performance and risk level); ii) Project or application’s characteristics (e.g. amount of investment and 
expected impact); iii. Conjectural factors (Euribor and regional GDP variation).The expected impact of 
each of them on the probability of obtaining public support, based on the literature review, is 
presented in Table 2. 
Variable name Variable description Expected 
sign 
job_pre Number of employees in the company the year before the application submission +/- 
Age Age of firms in the year of application submission +/- 
young_company Companies created after 2007 and with no activity (turnover near to zero).  +/- 
Industry, Tourism 
Services, Trade 
Other_sectors 
Activity sector of the application. Dummy variable. Other_sectors is the omitted 
reference category. 
+/- 
submit_before Has the company submitted an application to the Innovation Incentive System before 
this one? Dummy variable, where Yes = 1 and No = 0.  
+ 
ln_investment Total amount of investment foreseen by the company in the application form. 
Variable expressed as a logarithm. 
+ 
rd_pre Has the company a history of R&D activities in the year before the application 
submission? Dummy variable, where Yes = 1 and No = 0. 
+ 
var_patent Variation of the National and European patent number foreseen by the applicant as 
the result of investment project. 
+ 
financ_aut_pre Financial autonomy (equity/assets) in the year before the application submission + 
solvability_pre Solvability ratio (equity/debt) in the year before the application submission +/- 
roe_pre Return on Equity ratio (net income/equity) in the year before the application 
submission 
+/- 
                                                          
56The complementary log-log (cloglog) regression model is an alternative to the logit and probit ones. “Like the logit and probit model, the 
complementary log-log transformation ensures that predicted probabilities lie in the interval [0, 1]. Unlike the normal and logistic, the 
distribution function is not symmetric around zero but is skewed to the right” (Powers and Xie, 2008:64). In the present study the choice 
between a logit, probit and cloglog method is based on the model with a higher overall proportion of correct predictions. For more details 
see Appendix A.2. 
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exp_intens_post Export intensity (exportation/total turnover) foreseen in the year after project 
investment conclusion. 
+ 
var_net_inc Variation of net income foreseen as result of the investment project. Values 
expressed in thousands of euros. 
+ 
var_product Variation of productivity (variation of net income/variation of job) foreseen as result 
of the investment project. Values expressed in thousands of euros. 
+ 
var_job Variation of jobs number foreseen by the applicant as the result of investment 
project. 
+ 
var_skill_job Variation of skilled jobs number foreseen by the applicant as the result of investment 
project. Under the program regulation, a highly qualified worker is a person with at 
least a post-secondary pre-tertiary level of education. 
+ 
ln_euribor Euribor 12 months in the year of application submission +/- 
reg_gdp_var Variation of regional GDP at NUTS II in the year of application submission. +/- 
Table 2. Variable description and hypotheses 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1. Descriptive statistics 
Approved applications, compared with non-approved ones, foresee a statistically significant higher 
amount of investment and a higher increase in total employees, skilled jobs and number of patents 
(Table 3). Having experience in the PIIS procedures, measured by the variable of application 
submitted before, is also higher in the group with applications approved. 
Variable Approved Not approved All sample Diff means 
job_pre 4.991 4.804 4.894 0.186   
Age 6.329 5.234 5.758 1.095   
young_company 0.620 0.617 0.619 0.003   
Industry 0.394 0.255 0.322 0.138 *** 
Tourism 0.319 0.430 0.377 -0.110 ** 
Services 0.241 0.196 0.217 0.045   
Trade 0.032 0.055 0.044 -0.023   
other_sectors 0.014 0.064 0.040 -0.050 *** 
submit_before 0.194 0.106 0.149 0.088 *** 
Investment 3058.15 1913.12 2461.51 1145.02 ** 
rd_pre 0.079 0.043 0.060 0.036   
var_patent 0.435 0.196 0.310 0.239 ** 
financ_aut_pre 0.217 0.202 0.209 0.015   
solvability_pre 2.480 6.729 4.694 -4.248   
roe_pre -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 0.000   
exp_intensity_post 0.506 0.374 0.437 0.132 *** 
var_net_income 1078.848 1184.198 1133.742 -105.350   
var_productivity 80.451 95.328 88.267 -14.877   
var_job 13.912 9.434 11.579 4.478 *** 
var_skill_job 6.630 4.217 5.373 2.413 *** 
Euribor 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.000   
reg_gdp_var -0.022 -0.032 -0.027 0.010 *** 
Table 3. Comparison of means 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.  
Note: Number of observations 451. Approved applications 216 and not approved 235. ***, **, * indicate if the means are 
significantly different between ‘approved’ and ‘not approved’ application at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, 
based on t-Test. 
 
The applicant’s profile (job_pre, age, young_company and rd_pre) and its historical financial 
performance or risk (finance_aut_pre, solvability_pre, roe_pre) seem not to be statistically different 
between the groups – ‘approved’ and ‘not approved’ applications. 
Applications from industry, tourism and other_sectors are the only ones that are statistically different 
in the groups. 
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If we look at indicators which measure the impact of the project on the company's competitiveness 
(exp_intensity_post, var_net_income, var_productivity), the only variable where the difference of 
means is statistically significant is the export intensity indicator after project implementation. 
Finally,the macroeconomic environment represented by the regional GDP variation at NUTS II level 
appears to be statistically less unfavourable in areas where the application is approved. The value of 
Euribor in the year of application submission seems not to be statistically different between the 
groups. 
6.2. Model estimation and interpretation of results 
The medium-high correlation between some variables (see Appendix A.2.), namely: i) age, 
young_company and job_pre; ii) financ_aut_pre and roe_pre; iii) var_job and var_skill_job; iv) 
var_net_inc, var_skill_job and var_product, make it impossible to include all the variables in the 
model, due to possible problems of multicollinearity.  
Considering that public policy is generally more focused on skilled job creation (var_skill_job) and on 
contribution to added value (var_product), we choose to include these two variables in the model. 
Financial autonomy (financ_aut_pre) being one of the requirements in the first stage of the selection 
process, it seems the most interesting one to study the impact of ROE (roe_pre) on the probability of 
having an application approved by the PIIS. The final model (2) is expressed as follows: 
 
(2) 
The estimation of function  present in (2) is through the maximum likelihood method and the 
cloglog model (1), because if we compare with the results of other binary choice models, such as the 
logit and probit ones (see Appendix A.3.), we can see that the overall proportion of correct 
predictions is higher in the cloglog model and so it is the most appropriate. 
The result (Table 4) shows that the selection process is more focused on expected project impact 
than on firms’ past performance. Factors that influence the credit risk and the decision to give a bank 
loan, such as solvability ratio (solvability_pre) and return on equity (roe_pre), seem not to influence 
the government evaluator in funding some projects. Nor does previous experience in R&D activities 
(rd_pre_yes) seem to matter, despite Czarnitzki and Fier (2002) and Aschhoff (2009) finding a positive 
relationship between firms performing R&D on an occasional or continuous basis and the probability 
of receiving a subsidy. Indeed, the selection process of PIIS appears to give preference to companies 
that foresee an increase of patent portfolio (successful innovation) over those showing past R&D 
activities. However, as we can see in Table 4 the relationship between var_patent and the 
independent variable is not linear.  
Variables Coefficients (Std. Err) Marginal Effects  
job_pre -0.00617 (0.00832) -0.002   
Industry 1.720*** (0.610) 0.487 *** 
Tourism 1.180* (0.609) 0.334 * 
Services 1.590*** (0.612) 0.450 *** 
Trade 1.007 (0.745) 0.285   
submit_before 0.701*** (0.203) 0.198 *** 
ln_investment 0.126* (0.0652) 0.036 * 
rd_pre_yes 0.388 (0.351) 0.110   
var_patent 0.334** (0.154) 0.094 ** 
var_patent2 -0.0351** (0.0171) -0.010 ** 
solvability_pre -0.00157 (0.00210) 0.000   
roe_pre 0.346 (0.214) 0.098   
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exp_intensity 0.993*** (0.269) 0.281 *** 
var_productivity -0.00141** (0.000580) 0.000 ** 
var_skill_job 0.0671*** (0.0182) 0.019 *** 
var_skilljob2 -0.000674*** (0.000229) 0.000 *** 
ln_euribor 0.285** (0.115) 0.081 ** 
reg_gdp_var 4.573** (2.090) 1.294 ** 
Constant -2.992** (1.205)     
Observations 434      
Log likelihood function -253.22751      
Table 4. Results of model estimation 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration with STATA output. 
Legend:  *** coefficient significant at 1%, ** coefficient significant at 5% and * coefficient significant at 10%. Standard 
errors in parentheses.The results for Reset Test are available in Appendix A.3. 
 
The variation of patent number (var_patent) and the variation of skilled job (var_skill_job), as the 
result of the investment project, show an inverted U-shaped relationship with the probability of 
receiving the public incentive. This means that increasing the number of patents or the number of 
skilled jobs has a positive effect on the decision to fund an investment project, but at a higher level 
the effect tends to inverse and the probability of having an application selected decreases. One 
justification for this trend could be that projects with a higher number of additional patents in the 
short-term could be more risky and consequently have a higher risk of failure. Indeed, the process of 
patent registration could be hard and long. Then again, to hire a high number of new skilled workers 
could also be more risky because it requires a larger additional income in order to justify this and to 
make new jobs profitable. 
The variation in productivity (var_productivity) shows a slight negative impact, which means that 
having a project funded is linked to a low increase in productivity. This finding could suggest long-
term inefficiency in funded firms, as other authors (Bernini and Pelligrini, 2011; Jorge and Suárez, 
2011; Cerqua and Pelligrini, 2014) also found. One possible explanation could be that in the selection 
process increased employment has priority over increased net income (see also Table 3 with 
comparison of means). However, on the other hand, projects with high growth rates may also be too 
ambitious and sometimes unrealistic in terms of execution, in a country and region affected by the 
economic crisis, namely between 2009 and 2013. 
The export intensity ratio after project implementation (exp_intensity) shows, as expected, a positive 
impact on the probability of having an application funded, as Aerts and Thorwarth (2008) and 
Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento (2011) also found. Indeed, one goal of the program is to boost firms’ 
presence in international markets.  
The amount of investment (ln_investment) has a positive impact on the probability of being funded. 
If we take into account that, first, the amount of investment represents the sum of public incentive 
(percentage of the eligible investment) and private expenditure (equal to the remainder) and, 
second, the aim of the program is to stimulate innovative investment, it is expected that government 
will tend to approve applications with a higher amount of expenditure because this implies a greater 
private effort. This conclusion is also in line with Aerts and Thorwarth (2008:13), who found that 
receiving a subsidy has a positive impact on R&D efforts because funded companies show higher 
R&D expenditure than non-funded ones. Similarly, Santos et al. (2015) also find that the amount of 
funded investment has a positive impact on the probability of firm survival, because higher 
investments tend to be better planned. Because they are more risky, they need a higher additional 
cash-flow to be economically viable. So when governments choose to fund projects with a higher 
amount of investment, this tends to maximize the outcome: higher private effort and low failure 
rate. 
Previous experience in the PIIS (submit_before) increases by 19.8% the probability of having an 
application approved. The positive relationship between experience in subsidies and being a funded 
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firm, was demonstrated by other authors, such as Aerts and Thorwarth (2008), Aschhoff (2009) and 
Hud and Hussinger (2015), based on the “pick the winner” principle. Nevertheless, in our model this 
conclusion is not necessarily good news. On one hand, this could reveal that the public incentive goes 
more to the same companies, and that firms could receive more than one subvention under the PIIS. 
Or it could reveal that firms familiar with the application process, with more defendable, but not 
necessarily more viable projects, have a higher probability of obtaining public support.  
Company size, measured by the number of employees (job_pre), seems not to influence the 
probability of having an application approved, contrary to the literature (Appendix A.1.). However, 
this finding is not very surprising because our sample is mainly composed of micro and small 
companies (Figure 1), and the average number of employees in both groups (approved and not 
approved applications) is almost the same and around 5 workers (Table 3).   
The activity sector of the investment project also matters, particularly if it is in the industry, tourism 
and services sector. Compared to other sectors (reference category), applications in these areas have 
a higher probability of being approved, possibly because the regional policy is more focused on 
developing innovation in these sectors, due to regional specialization, namely in agri-business and 
tourism activities. Then again, services is a sector with  high added value and growth potential. 
The model shows that when firms have a higher cost of financing their project in the financial 
market, represented by the Euribor (ln_euribor), the probability of having an application approved 
increases. This conclusion could illustrate the mechanism of public support in trying to reduce the 
cost of innovation and in counteracting the financial market’s failings. 
In periods of economic growth (reg_gdp_var) the probability of getting a subsidy increases, which 
could mean that the public instrument is not effective in the period when it approves projects, 
because an inverse relationship should be the case. In periods of economic crisis, the aim of the 
public instrument is to improve conditions for launching more projects in the regions. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
The Portuguese Innovation Incentive System was an important instrument of the NSRD 2007 – 2013, 
developed with the aim of stimulating innovation and promoting competitiveness. Between 2007 
and 2013, 451 applications to PIIS were submitted under the Alentejo Regional Operational Program. 
The approval rate was 48%. Entities in charge of evaluating applications showed on average an 
effective selection process, particularly when the incentive is supposed to counteract financial 
market failings. Indeed, an interesting finding was that when firms have a higher cost of financing 
investment, the public policy instrument seems to provide additional financial support to innovative 
firms, in order to be more competitive. On the other hand, some firm characteristics that influence 
credit risk, such as size, profitability and solvency ratio, are not relevant factors in the PIIS selection 
process. However, government evaluators are also cautious, selecting projects with a low potential 
failure risk, in order to maximize the expected outcome for society. 
Nevertheless, government preference for promoting employment is shown to be higher than the 
impact on firm productivity, which in the long-run could mean firm inefficiency.  The Portuguese 
Innovation Incentive System seems to be more focused on short-term results, such as increasing the 
number of jobs and intensifying the external commercial relationship, than on the sustainability of 
the outcome. This finding could be useful for policy-makers in order to redirect policy objectives 
towards promoting efficiency in subsidized firms and putting the effectiveness of the instrument for 
job creation in the background. Increasing employment in the short-term in a country and/or region 
with a high unemployment rate is important, but supporting the creation of new jobs sustainable for 
firms’ needs remains the priority.  
In future research, special attention will be given to explaining the determinants of financial 
performance in subsidized firms, in order to better understand the long-term firm inefficiency 
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phenomena in the subsidized context. It could also be interesting to assess the differences between 
performance in firms subject to more and less financial constraints. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A.1. Benchmark  
Authors Country Methodology Variables (significance and impact) 
Czarnitzki and 
Fier (2002) 
Germany Probit 
(firm-level) 
Significant variables: (+) n° of employees, (+) share of employees 
with university degree in the field of business administration; (+) 
firm located in eastern region; (+) firm with continuous R&D 
activities; (-) population density where firm is located; (-) traffic 
activity in relation to other business services 
Not significant variables: share of employees with university 
degree in the field of natural science and engineering; age; 
sectorial/industry growth rates where firm operated; firm legal 
forms with limited liability; industry dummy – wholesale, retail 
trade, ICT services, technical services.      
Blanes and 
Busom (2004) 
Spain Multinomial 
logit  
(firm-level) 
Doing R&D and participating in R&D programs results 
Significant variables: (+) share of university graduates and 
engineers in the firm; (+) n° of employees; (+) domestic firm. 
Not significant variables: age; firm’s cash flow. 
Aerts and 
Thorwarth 
(2008) 
Belgium 
(Flanders) 
Probit 
(firm-level) 
Significant variables: (+) amount of subsidy by project; (+) number 
of project proposals submitted; (+) export quota. 
Not significant variables: n° of employees; firms’ patent stock by 
employees; fixed assets by employees; cash-flow by employees; 
belonging to a group; domestic or foreign ownership. 
González and 
Pazó (2008) 
Spain Probit 
(firm-level) 
Significant variables: (+) firm has received a subsidy in the previous 
period; (+) n° of employees; (+) capital growth (in equipment and 
machinery goods); (+) age; (+) technological sophistication in 
production; (+) foreign capital; (+) domestic export; (+) Navarre and 
Basque County.    
Not significant variables: firm with market power.   
Aschhoff (2009) Germany Logit 
(firm-level) 
Significant variables: (+) previous experience in subsidy scheme; (+) 
firm received subsidy from other sources; (+) n.° of employees; (+) 
firm performed R&D on an occasional or continuous basis; (+) share 
of employees with a university degree; (+) deviation of firm patent 
stock from industry mean; (-) firm is part of domestic company 
group; (-) firm has foreign headquarters.   
Not significant variables: change in the n° of employees; age; firm 
located in eastern region. 
Czarnitzki and 
Lopes Bento  
(2011) 
Germany Probit 
(firm-level) 
Significant variables: (-/+) U-shaped relationship with firm size (n° 
of employees); (+) fixed assets by employee; (+) patent stock by 
employee; (-) availability of internal funds; (+) firm with an internal 
R&D lab; (-) firm headquarters in foreign territory; (+) age; (+) 
export intensity; (+) firm located in eastern region. 
Not significant variables: firm is part of group. 
Hud and 
Hussinger (2015) 
Germany Probit 
(firm-level) 
Significant variables: (+) firms has received a subsidy in the past; 
(+) patent stock by employees; (+) n° of employees; (+) export sales; 
(-) firm is part of an enterprise group; (-) age; (+) firm located in 
eastern region; (-) credit rating; (-) activity sector (mining; 
manufacturing; energy, water and recycling; wholesale; 
transportation and consulting). 
Not significant variables: firm group with foreign headquarters; 
industry-specific sales growth rate; ICT. 
Table A.1. Benchmark studies focused on the probability of receiving a public subsidy 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on Czarnitzki and Fier (2002), Blanes and Busom (2004), Aerts and Thorwarth, 
(2008), González and Pazó (2008), Aschhoff (2009), Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento (2011), Hud and Hussinger (2015). 
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Appendix A.2. Correlation matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. Correlation matrix 
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